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I. INTRODUCTION
Pascal's1 analytical approach to a universally perplexing
problem provides important clues to understanding why modern
utilities believe that acquiring new energy resources is unavoida-
ble. Pascal was concerned with the problem of whether to
believe in God. Unable to prove or disprove God's existence, he
examined the consequences of selecting the wrong option. To
Pascal, the consequences of mistakenly believing that God did
not exist far outweighed the consequences of wrongly believing
that God existed, particularly if God were retributive and con-
demned nonbelievers to eternal damnation. Pascal's conclusion
that it was safer to believe in God is commonly known as "Pas-
cal's Wager."
The logic of Pascal's Wager applies to the construction of
electric power resources because, like God's existence, the future
demand for electric power is unknown.' Utilities attempt to pre-
dict future demand, s however, their forecasts' 4 accuracies are
* The opinions presented here are solely those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views of the Bonneville Power Administration or the United States
Department of Energy.
** J.D. Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College, 1980; B.S. Univer-
sity of Wisconsin-Madison, 1972; member, Oregon State Bar; Attorney, Office of General
Counsel, Bonneville Power Administration, United States Department of Energy.
1. Blaise Pascal was a 17th century French mathematician, scientist, and philoso-
pher. His major accomplishments involved fluid mechanics and algebraic expansions.
2. See PACIFIC NORTHWEST REGIONAL COMMISSION, ENERGY FUTURES NoRmwzs'r
NORTHWEST ENERGY POLICY PROJECT FINAL REPORT 66 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
ENERGY FUTURES].
3. For a general discussion of forecasting, see BONNEVILLE PowER ADMINISTRATION
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, THE ROLE OF THx BONNEVILLE PoWxx ADMINISTRATION IN
THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM, INCLUDING ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE
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uncertain. Utilities often develop two or more precise forecasts
HYDRO-THERMAL POWER PROGRAM: A PROGRAM ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT AND PLAN-
NING REPORT (DRm ROLE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT) part 1, at IV-1 to -110
(1977) [hereinafter cited as DREIS]. Forecasts may be hourly, daily, weekly, monthly,
yearly or longer. Utilities use short-term forecasts for operational purposes, while long-
term forecasts are used to plan new generating facilities which may require a decade or
more from planning to completion. Id. at IV-1. There are three general techniques of
forecasting: simulation, time series projection, and holistic analysis. Id. at IV-16.
The validity of the simulation technique depends on the premise that the whole is
equal to the sum of its parts. The theory is that if the basic components of a system can
be identified and their individual effects on future energy demand estimated through
statistical analysis, the sum of the estimated component effects yields the total fore-
casted demand. Id. at IV-22 to -29. This process, called econometric modeling, is a com-
monly used simulation method of analyzing the relationship between known economic
variables. The econometric model's advantage is that it provides an estimate of the fore-
cast's reliability in addition to the demand estimate. Id. at IV-25 to -26. The econometric
model's disadvantage is that it requires an extensive and accurate data base. Id. at IV-
23. Even though econometric modeling is based on sound mathematical theory, a recent
study indicates that:
[T]he field of econometric estimation invariably harbors a multitude of obsta-
cles and complexities which, if unaccounted for, can trap the unwary practi-
tioner. The validity of those assumptions which justify the use of one or the
other method of estimation is often questionable in practice. Even the validity
of statistical tests which normally indicate the presence of econometric difficul-
ties can be nullified under certain fairly common conditions. [T]he application
of econometrics should proceed only with great caution.
NORTHWEST ENERGY POLICY PROJECT, ENERGY DEMAND MODELING AND FORECASTING
FINAL REPORT 15 (1977).
The time series projection technique involves selection of a series of historical data
based on the analyst's judgment that the series approximates future behavior and extra-
polation of the data to make predictions. The analyst may consider past demand trends,
seasonal variations, cyclical variations such as fluctuations in business activity, pattern
identification such as shifts in life-styles, and the probability of various future outcomes.
The accuracy of time series projection depends on the truthfulness of the adage history
repeats itself. See DREIS, supra, at IV-16 to -21. See also NORTHWEST ENERGY POLICY
PROJECT, supra, at 4-6.
The basic premise for a holistic analysis is that the whole is greater than the sum of
its parts, thus demonstrating that econometric models produce unreliable forecasts. See
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 628 (1976). A holistic
analysis attempts to identify broad systemwide factors influencing demand rather than
focusing on the individual components' effects. Analysts then combine the systemwide
factors to form scenarios based on expert opinions. In short, holistic analyses are analo-
gous to educated guesses. See DREIS, supra, at IV-21 to -22.
In developing load forecasts for the Pacific Northwest, the Pacific Northwest Utili-
ties Conference Committee (PNUCC), a voluntary organization of utilities, totals the
individual load forecasts for each utility service area. The PNUCC does not attempt to
standardize forecasting methods; each utility uses any technique it wishes. Thus, the
PNUCC forecast is a potpourri of forecasting techniques, and the uncertainty in the
total forecast is equal to the sum of the uncertainties of each forecast. See generally S.
MEYER, DATA ANALYSIS FOR SCIENTIS'S AND ENGINEERS 39-48 (1975).
4. Demand forecasters use statistical techniques to estimate their forecasts' errors. A
common technique is the standard deviation which is an estimate of the probability that
the true demand will fall within a specified tolerance. See, e.g., S. MEYER, supra note 3,
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predicting widely divergent increases in future demand.' When
utilities produce inconsistent forecasts, three questions arise:
first, should the utility meet the projected demand?; second,
which demand forecast should the utility believe?; and third,
which resources should be constructed?
Most utilities' have answered the first question, whether to
meet the projected demand, affirmatively. In exchange for
monopoly status, state legislatures have burdened investor-
owned utilities and public and peoples' utility districts with the
statutory obligation to provide sufficient power to meet all
future demand.7 Furthermore, even if this requirement did not
exist, utilities would tend to construct resources to meet pro-
jected increased demand for four reasons: first, everyone wants
to be captain of a big ship;' second, businesses naturally tend to
expand wherever there is a market;9 third, utilities seek to
update and expand their facilities,10 thereby locking them into a
psychology favoring technological improvements and a projected
increased demand creates an opportunity to update and expand
their facilities; and finally, the tax laws, through such devices as
investment credits, encourage expansion." In short, utilities per-
at 22.
5. A forecast may be "precise" yet inaccurate. If a forecast predicts the same value
each time future demand is measured, the forecast is said to be "precise." If the fore-
casted demand is twice the actual demand, however, the forecast is clearly inaccurate,
though precise. Thus, two "precise" forecasts may have different accuracies and hence
vary in the amount of predicted demand. See generally F. DANIELS, EXPERIMENTAL PHYS-
ICAL CHEMISTRY 429-54 (1970).
6. The term "utility," in this analysis, means any entity which sells electric power.
7. E.g., the Oregon statutes provide: "Every public utility is required to furnish ade-
quate . . . service." OR. REv. STAT. § 757.020 (1979). "The Legislative Assembly finds
and declares it to be in the public interest and for a public purpose that [Peoples' Utility
Districts] . . . meet the future power needs of this state and its inhabitants." OR. REv.
STAT. § 261.240(1)(b) (1979). This duty to meet all future power needs is termed public
utility responsibility.
8. Conversations with Dr. Mike Katz, BPA economist, in Portland, Or. (1980).
9. Utilities or any other business will normally seek to exploit unsatisfied demand.
This is especially true if a company is a monopoly, because the business risks associated
with expanded production in a competitive market are nonexistent. See generally M.
FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE (1980).
10. Upgrading occurs when a utility seeks to keep its facilities in state-of-the-art
condition even at the expense of replacing components that are still fully functional.
Because the public guarantees some utilities (investor-owned-utilities, not peoples' util-
ity districts) a reasonable rate of return on investment, utilities tend to upgrade their
facilities beyond what engineering considerations justify. This gold plating is sometimes
referred to as the "Avererech-Johnson effect," named after the authors who described
the phenomenon.
11. The Internal Revenue Code provides for an investment credit equal to the sum
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ceive strong incentives to construct additional resources to meet
future demand.
Resorting to Pascal's Wager helps to answer the second
question of which demand forecast to believe. Utilities perceive
the social cost of an energy shortage as significantly greater than
the social cost of constructing idle resources.' 2 Thus, when a
of the following percentages of the qualified investment: (i) the regular percentage
(10%); (ii) in the case of energy property, the energy percentage (presently 10%); and
(iii) the ESOP percentage (presently 1%). I.R.C. § 46(a)(2)(A).
12.
Energy Planning based on forecasts that are too low means running the risk of
having to install high-cost inefficient stop-gap resources, of shortages and
rationing, of shortfalls in economic performance, of dangers to public safety
from brownouts or from dreaded rotating blackouts, of the threat of cascading
outages, of inconveniences and suffering as occurred in parts of the United
States during the severe winter of 1976-1977. Attempts have been made to
assign a dollar value to the costs of electricity shortages, the most recent of
which has estimated the value to be on the order of $1.00 per kilowatt-hour of
electricity.
ENERGY FUTURES, supra note 2, at 66 (footnote omitted) (1975 dollars).
The following table shows three different planning assumptions: (1) a low-energy
growth demand forecast; (2) a medium demand forecast; and (3) a high demand forecast.
The left column lists the loads which actually develop (any one of which may occur).
Positive numbers indicate a surplus of energy; negative numbers indicate an energy
shortage.
Table I
Alternative Planning Assumptions: 1990 (Billions of Kilowatt-Hours)
Loads Which Alternative Planning Assumptions
Actually Develop Low Medium High
Low 0.0 33.3 62.3
Medium -33.3 0.0 29.0
High -62.3 -29.0 0.0
Computations are based on Northwest Energy Policy Project 1990 demand forecasts for
electricity for the Northwest States of Idaho, Oregon, and Washington. ENERGY FUTruRES,
supra note 2, at 67.
Table II, infra, converts the Table I figures into annual dollar costs (in 1975 dollars)
in 1990. Two key assumptions underlie these cost projections. First, the projections
assume the cost of excess capacity equals the annual fixed cost (approximately 15% of
the total cost) of fully completed, unused facilities. This is an unrealistic assumption
because it is probable that the utilities can sell surplus power outside the region and
planners can delay construction on unfinished plants, once they recognize that those
plants will temporarily constitute excess capacity. Second, the table assumes the cost of
a shortage is ten cents per kilowatt hour, one-tenth of California's most recent estimate.
Yet the ten cent figure probably more nearly reflects the cost of adding combustion tur-
bines on a crash basis and operating them at far above design capacity. This assumes
that utilities will foresee a shortage early enough to install combustion turbines, even
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utility compares the consequences of not building additional
resources because of belief in a low demand forecast, where in
fact demand is high, with the consequences of building addi-
tional resources, because of a belief in a high demand forecast
where in fact demand is low, the logic of Pascal's Wager leads
the utility to believe the greater demand forecast' 8 and construct
additional resources. Recent forecasts indicate that electric
power demand in the Pacific Northwest will grow significantly in
the next decade14 and presently no resources are idle in the
Pacific Northwest. Therefore, without resource development the
though installation of such turbines takes a relatively short time. A utility's failure to
foresee a shortage would produce much greater shortage costs than Table II presents.
Table II
Annual Costs of Overbuilding and Underbuilding Electrical Generating Facilities: 1990
(Billions of 1975 Dollars)
Loads Which Alternative Planning Assumptions
Actually Develop Low Medium High
Low 0.00 .44 .82
Medium 3.33 0.00 .38
High 6.23 2.90 0.00
Table III shows that even assuming shortage costs of only $0.025 per kilowatt hour
(less than the present residential rate for most Oregon energy consumers), the costs of
underbuilding are still significantly greater than the costs of overbuilding.
Table III
Annual Costs of Overbuilding and Underbuilding Electrical Generating Facilities:
Alternative Assumption: 1990 (Billions of 1975 Dollars)
Loads Which
Alternative Planning Assumptions
Actually Develop LOw Medium High
Low 0.00 .44 .82
Medium .83 0.00 .38
High 1.53 .72 0.00
13. Power planners do not expect that Pacific Northwest resources will remain idle
for long, because (1) there is a market for surplus energy outside the region; (2) even if
demand increased slowly, the region would eventually utilize the idle capacity; and (3)
surplus energy would attract energy intensive industries to the area.
14. The Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference Committee in 1980 forecasted an
annual growth rate of 4.5%. ENERGY FuTuRns, supra note 2, at 67. That rate, if accurate,
would double resource requirements in less than 15 years. Id. at 66-67.
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region will be unable to meet projected demand. The accuracy of
demand forecasts" becomes immaterial to a utility's decision to
build new resources because the logic of Pascal's Wager forces
utilities to believe reasonable, but pessimistic forecasts. Thus,
Pacific Northwest utilities will construct new resources to meet
higher demand forecast. Consequently, the ultimate question
becomes what type of resources the utilities should build.
This article discusses how the Pacific Northwest Electric
Power Planning and Conservation Act' 6 (PNEPPCA) may affect
the region's choice of resources to construct. Potential choices
range from conventional resources such as coal and nuclear to
renewable resources such as geothermal, biomass, wave, tidal,
solar, and wind. In addition, conservation and cogeneration' 7 are
now viable energy alternatives. This discussion focuses on
PNEPPCA's resource acquisition priority scheme and provides
an overview of the incentives and disincentives which may influ-
ence the resource selection process. Rather than predicting
which resources the region's utilities may ultimately construct,
this article analyzes the legal barriers proponents of particular
resources must overcome and the tools those proponents may
employ to advance their respective interests.
II. THE BILL'S BASIC STRUCTURE
A. The Administrator,5 The Regional Planning Council, and
The Electric Power Plan
The central figure in the Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning and Conservation Act is the Bonneville Power Admin-
istrator. According to some critics, the Act changes the Adminis-
trator's role from marketer of surplus federal power to Pacific
Northwest energy czar. The Federal Columbia River Power Sys-
15. For a discussion of demand forecasting, see note 3 supra.
16. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No.
96-501, 94 Stat. 2697 (1980),(to be codified at 16 U.S.C. § 839) [hereinafter cited as
PNEPPCA].
17. Cogeneration is the process of producing steam from a single boiler for two pur-
poses: (1) to provide energy needed for industrial processes and (2) to generate electricity
for in-plant consumption. See generally OREGON STATE BAR (CoNINUING LEGAL EDUCA-
TION), INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND COGENERATION OF ELECTRICITY (1979).
18. The "Administrator" means the Administrator of the Bonneville Power Admin-
istration, PNEPPCA supra, note 16, § 3(2), 94 Stat. 2688. For a description of the func-
tions of the Bonneville Power Administration, see Foote, Larsen & Maddox, Bonneville
Power Administration: Northwest Power Broker, 6 ENvT'L L. Ray. 831, 833-34 (1976).
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tem,'9 built by the Administrator, however, provides a unique
opportunity to combine and operate the region 's20 generating
and transmitting facilities as if a single utility owned them. This
one-utility concept is the Act's major theme. To achieve this
objective, the Act created the Pacific Northwest Electric Power
Planning Council.21
The Council must adopt a regional electric power plan22
designed, through a system of incentives, to achieve a level of
cooperation among the region's electric energy suppliers
approaching the idealized single-utility goal. PNEPPCA requires
the Administrator to act consistent with the Council's plan."
19. For a description of the Federal Columbia River Power System (FCRPS), see
Hittle, Larsen, Randall & Michie, Pacific Northwest Power Generation, Multipurpose
Use of the Columbia River and Regional Energy Legislation: An Overview, 10 ENVT'L L.
Rv. 235 (1980).
20. The Pacific Northwest "region" officially includes:
(A) the area consisting of the States of Oregon, Washington, and Idaho, the
portion of the State of Montana west of the Continental Divide, and such por-
tions of the States of Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming as are within the Columbia
River drainage basin; and
(B) any contiguous areas, not in excess of seventy-five air miles from the area
referred to in subparagraph (A), which are part of the service area of a rural
electric cooperative customer served by the Administrator on the effective date
of this Act which has a distribution system from which it serves both within
and without such region.
PNEPPCA, supra note 16, § 3(14), 94 Stat. 2700.
21. The Act specifies:
[T]here shall be established a regional agency known as the "Pacific Northwest
Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council" which (i) shall have its
offices in the Pacific Northwest, (ii) shall carry out its functions and responsi-
bilities in accordance with the provisions of this Act, (iii) shall continue in
force and effect in accordance with the provisions of this Act, and (iv) except
as otherwise provided in this Act, shall not be considered an agency or instru-
mentality of the United States for the purpose of any Federal law.
Id. § 4(a)(2)(A), 94 Stat. 2701.
22. See id.
23. The Act requires the Administrator to act consistently with the regional plan:
"Following adoption of the plan and any amendment thereto, all actions of the Adminis-
trator pursuant to section 6 of this Act shall be consistent with the plan and any amend-
ment thereto, except as otherwise specifically provided in this Act." Id. § 4(d)(2), 94
Stat. 2705.
The Administrator shall use the Bonneville Power Administrator fund and the
authorities available to the Administrator under this Act and other laws
administered by the Administrator to protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and
wildlife to the extent affected by the development and operation of any hydro-
electric project of the Columbia River and its tributaries in a manner consis-
tent with the plan, if in existence, the program adopted by the Council under
this subsection, and the purposes of this Act. Expenditures of the Administra-
tor pursuant to this paragraph shall be in addition to, not in lieu of, other
expenditures authorized or required from other entities under other agree-
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PNEPPCA further requires that the plan reflect the following
priority scheme for resource acquisition:24 first, conservation;
second, renewable resources; third, generating resources utilizing
waste heat or generating resources of high fuel conversion effi-
ciency; and fourth, all other resources.25 Thus, the consistency
provision" requires the Administrator to defer to the priority
scheme and makes the resource priority scheme a major factor
in deciding which resources the region should construct. But as
this article illustrates, the key factor in the selection of resources
is actually cost-effectiveness rather than the resource priority
scheme.
B. The Four Big Carrots
1. The Administrator's Public Utility Responsibility
The importance of the one-utility concept is reflected in the
Act's four major incentives, designed to bring utilities under the
plan's control voluntarily. First, at a preference customer's2 7 or
ments or provisions of law.
Id. § 4(h)(10)(A), 94 Stat. 2710.
The Administrator and other Federal agencies responsible for managing,
operating or regulating Federal or non-Federal hydroelectric facilities located
on the Columbia River or its tributaries shall-
(i) exercise such responsibilities consistent with the purposes of this Act
and other applicable laws, to adequately protect, mitigate, and enhance fish
and wildlife, including related spawning grounds and habitat, affected by such
projects or facilities in a manner that provides equitable treatment for such
fish and wildlife with the other purposes for which such system and facilities
are managed and operated;
(ii) exercise such responsibilities, taking into account at each relevant
stage of decision-making processes to the fullest extent practicable, the pro-
gram adopted by the Council under this subsection. If, and to the extent that,
such other Federal agencies as a result of such consideration impose upon any
non-Federal electric power project measures to protect, mitigate, and enhance
fish and wildlife which are not attributable to the development and operation
of such project, then the resulting monetary costs and power losses (if any)
shall be borne by the Administrator in accordance with this subsection.
Id. § 4(h)(11)(A), 94 Stat. 2710-2711.
24. "'Resource' means (A) electric power, including the actual or planned electric
power capability of generating facilities, or (B) actual or planned load reduction resulting
from direct application of a renewable energy resource by a consumer, or from a conser-
vation measure." Id. § 3(19), 94 Stat. 2700.
25. Id. § 4(e)(1), 94 Stat. 2705.
26. See id. § 4(d)(2), 94 Stat. 2705.
27. The drafters derived the term "preference customer" from the so-called prefer-
ence clause in the Bonneville Project Act which requires the Administrator to give pref-
erence to "public bodies and cooperatives" when allocating federal hydropower. 16
U.S.C. § 832c(a) (1976). PNEPPCA preserves the preference clause: "All power sales
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investor-owned utility's request, the Act requires the Adminis-
trator to offer to sell sufficient
electric power"" to meet the firm power' load of such public
body, cooperative or investor-owned utility in the region to the
extent that such firm power load exceeds (A) the capability of
such entity firm peaking and energy resources ...and (B)
such other resources as such entity determines .. will be
used to serve its firm load in the region.30
Thus, a utility confronted with a projected resource shortage can
acquire its own resources or purchase the needed electric power
from BPA. Consequently, under PNEPPCA, the Administrator
has public utility responsibility8 ' which may convert the Admin-
under this Act shall be subject at all times to the preference and priority provisions of
the Bonneville Project Act of 1937." PNEPPCA, supra note 16, § 5(a), 94 Stat. 2712. For
an excellent discussion of preference clauses in general, see Fereday, The Meaning of the
Preference Clause in Hydroelectric Power Allocation Under the Federal Reclamation
Statutes, 9 ENw'L L. REV. 601 (1979).
28. "'Electric power' means electric peaking capacity, or electric energy, or both."
PNEPPCA, supra note 16, § 3(9), 84 Stat. 2699. It is important to distinguish capacity
from energy. Capacity is the maximum rate at which a resource can produce energy.
Thus, capacity, measured in kilowatts, is merely the maximum power potential of a
resource. Energy, on the other hand, is a measure of the amount of work that can be
done by applying the power output of a resource for a specific time to a given task.
Therefore, energy equals capacity multiplied by time. For example, a 100-watt light bulb
consumes one kilowatt-hour of electricity (energy) every 10 hours. But a power supply
(capacity) equal to 100 watts is sufficient to light the bulb. Similarly, it takes a one
kilowatt power supply to light ten 100-watt bulbs which will collectively consume one
kilowatt-hour of energy every hour.
29. A "customer" is an entity that contracts to purchase power from the Adminis-
trator pursuant to PNEPPCA. Id. § 3(7), 94 Stat. 2699. A "consumer" is "any end user
of electric power." Id. § 3(5), 94 Stat. 2699. BPA presently sells power to investor-owned
utilities, peoples' utility districts, Federal agencies, and direct service industries. This
policy would continue under the bill. See generally id. § 5, 94 Stat. 2712-2716.
"Firm power" is power that is available at all times, even under adverse conditions,
except by reason of certain uncontrollable forces such as sabotage, earthquakes, or ice
storms which may sever transmission lines or damage facilities. Because the Administra-
tor markets hydroelectric power, the amount of firm power depends on the Columbia
River's lowest flow. The power generated during the period of least flow represents
BPA's "firm power." The Administrator uses a 42-month critical flow period to deter-
mine the amount of firm power it can allocate among preference customers. The Admin-
istrator can increase the amount of firm power by increasing the length of the critical
flow period, however, such manipulations decrease the degree of firmness because the
longer the critical flow period, the higher the probability that such low flows will occur. If
the actual flow were to fall below the critical flow, the Administrator would have allo-
cated more firm power than it had to allocate. Thus, the ideal approach is to guess con-
servatively by picking a critical flow period that is unique. See Hittle, supra note 19, at
266-74.
30. PNEPPCA, supra note 16, § 5(b)(1), 94 Stat. 2712 (footnotes added).
31. The Administrator's public utility responsibility is slightly different from the
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istrator into the dominant regional resource acquisition entity.
2. Electricity Exchange Sales
Second, the Act requires the Administrator to purchase
electric power offered by any Northwest electric utility and, in
exchange, 2 to offer to sells an equivalent amount of electric
power back to that utility for resale to its residential 4 consum-
ers. Through this exchange device, a utility can reduce the price
of electric power sold to its residential consumers because the
Administrator would purchase the electric power at the utility's
average system cost and sell the electric power back to the util-
ity at a melded rate which includes low-cost hydroelectric
power.3 5 In lieu of purchasing the power offered by such utility,
"the Administrator may acquire an equivalent amount of elec-
tric power from other sources to replace power sold to such util-
ity as part of an exchange sale if the cost of such acquisition is
usual definition of public utility responsibility. For a traditional definition of public util-
ity responsibility, see note 7 supra. The Administrator's responsibility is triggered by a
utility's request for power to meet a projected shortage, whereas the traditional public
utility responsibility to supply electric power arises from the projected shortage itself.
The Act states: "Whenever requested the Administrator shall offer to sell ...electric
power to meet the firm power load of such public body, cooperative or investor-owned
utility in the Region. ... PNEPPCA, supra note 16, § 5(b)(1), 94 Stat. 2712. Appar-
ently, PNEPPCA does not require the requesting customer to make such requests within
a specified lead time. Unless the Administrator knows how much electric power it must
supply, however, it cannot plan its own acquisitions accordingly. In interpreting this sec-
tion, the practical constraints on developing and acquiring resources seem likely to
necessitate a reasonable lead time standard; it is impossible to receive a request for elec-
tric power equal to the output of a nuclear power plant on Tuesday and deliver such
electric power on Wednesday unless extensive prior planning has occurred. Because the
Council must prepare 20-year demand forecasts, see id. § 4(e)(3)(D), 94 Stat. 2706, effi-
cient planning mandates imposition of advance notice requirements.
32. See id. § 5(c)(1), 94 Stat. 2713.
33. The Administrator must establish wholesale rates that: (1) are sufficient to repay
the federal investment in the Federal Columbia River Power System over a reasonable
number of years; (2) are based on the Administrator's total system costs; and (3) equita-
bly allocate the costs of the federal transmission system between federal and non-federal
users of such system. See id. § 7(a)(2), 94 Stat. 2723. Thus the Administrator will resell
power to the offering utility at a melded rate (total system costs), generally less than the
price of the power the utility offered to the Administrator at average system cost because
the electric power the utility re-purchases will include low-cost federal hydropower. The
Act, however, requires the requesting utility to pass the cost benefits on to residential
customers directly. See id. § 5(c)(3), 94 Stat. 2713.
34. "'Residential use' or 'residential load' means all usual residential, apartment,
seasonal dwelling and farm electrical loads or uses, but only the first four hundred horse-
power during any monthly billing period of farm irrigation and pumping for any farm."
PNEPPCA, supra note 16, § 3(18), 94 Stat. 2700.
35. See note 33 supra.
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less than the cost of purchasing the electric power offered by
such utility." 6
3. The Administrator's Bonding Authority
Third, the Act authorizes the Administrator to issue bonds
in the Administrator's name to implement the Administrator's
authority.37 This provision is limited, however, and the Adminis-
trator may not issue bonds to acquire a generating facility with a
planned capability of more than fifty average megawatts." The
Act endows the Administrator with broad bonding authority for
providing funds for conservation and renewable resource loans
and grants.89 Therefore, because utilities can shift funding
responsibility for resource acquisition to the Administrator by
merely requesting from the Administrator electric power to meet
their own electric power requirements, the Administrator's
acquisition bonding authority would seem to represent a signifi-
cant financial tool to develop renewable resources and
conservation.
4. The Dry-Hole Provisions
The final incentive to induce utilities to come under the
plan voluntarily is the Act's dry-hole provisions. The Adminis-
trator's ratepayers may absorb the cost of an acquired resource
that never comes on line because the term "resource" includes"planned electric power capability of generating facilities, or
.. .planned load reduction resulting from direct application of
a renewable energy resource by a consumer, or from a conserva-
36. PNEPPCA, supra note 16, § 5(c)(5), 94 Stat. 2714.
37. The Administrator is authorized to issue and sell to the Secretary of the
Treasury from time to time in the name and for and on behalf of the Bonne-
ville Power Administration bonds, notes, and other evidences of indebtedness
. ..to assist in financing the construction, acquisition, and replacement of the
transmission system, to implement the Administrator's authority pursuant to
the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act (includ-
ing his authority to provide financial assistance for conservation measures,
renewable resources, and fish and wildlife, but not including the authority to
acquire under section 6 of that Act electric power from a generating facility
having a planned capability greater than fifty average megawatts), and to issue
and sell bonds to refund such bonds.
Pacific Northwest Federal Transmission System Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 838 (West Supp.
1980), as amended by PNEPPCA, supra note 16, § 8(d), 94 Stat. 2729 (parenthetical
contains amended language).
38. See id.
39. Id.
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tion measure."' In certain instances the Act also authorizes the
Administrator to fund or secure debts incurred in the investiga-
tion and initial development of renewable resources 41 which may
be eligible for acquisition by the Administrator. 4' Further, the
Administrator may reimburse sponsors of any other resource for
investigation and preconstruction expenses48 if that resource was
not constructed because (1) a state denied siting approval or
other necessary permits, (2) a federal agency denied a necessary
permit, (3) such investigation demonstrated that the resource
did not meet the criteria of section 4(e)(1)" and the considera-
tions of section 4(e)(2), 48 (4) the resource was environmentally
unacceptable, or (5) the Administrator decided not to acquire
the resource. 4" Thus, the Administrator's ratepayers may bear a
significant portion of the risks and costs of developing new
energy resources. These dry-hole provisions thus provide a
strong financial incentive for individual utilities to cooperate
with the plan because the Administrator's acquiring their
40. Id. § 3(19), 94 Stat. 2700 (emphasis added). "[Miajor resources shall be deemed
to be acquired upon publication (of notice of the decision) in the Federal Register .... "
Id. § 9(e)(4)(A), 94 Stat. 2731. "[R]esources, other than major resources, shall be deemed
to be acquired upon execution of the contract therefor. . . ." Id. § 9(e)(4)(B), 94 Stat.
2731. "[Cjonservation measures shall be deemed to be implemented upon execution of
the contract or grant therefor . . . ." Id. § 9(e)(4)(C), 94 Stat. 2731.
41. Renewable resources which are also major resources are not included within this
provision. PNEPPCA, supra note 16, § 6(f)(1)(A), 94 Stat. 2719. A "major resource" is a
resource which (A) has a planned capability greater than fifty average megawatts, and
(B) if acquired by the Administrator, is acquired for a period of more than five years."
Id. § 3(12), 94 Stat. 2699.
42. Id. § 6(f)(1)(A), 94 Stat. 2719.
43. Such expenses "shall not include procurement of capital equipment or construc-
tion material." Id. § 6(f)(1)(B), 94 Stat. 2720.
44. The plan gives priority to cost-effective resources. Further, "[p]riority shall be
given: first, to conservation; second, to renewable resources; third, to generating
resources utilizing waste heat or generating resources of high fuel conversion efficiency;
and fourth, to all other resources." Id. § 4(e)(1), 94 Stat. 2705.
45. Considerations include "(A) environmental quality, (B) compatibility with the
existing regional power system, (C) protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and
wildlife and related spawning grounds and habitat, including sufficient quantities and
qualities of flows for successful migration, survival, and propagation of anadromous fish,
and (D) other criteria which may be set forth in the plan." Id. § 4(e)(2), 94 Stat. 2706.
46. The Administrator must demonstrate "inequitable hardship" to the consumers
or the sponsors of these resources to implement section 6(f) of the Act. Id. § 6(f)(1)-(2),
94 Stat. 2719-2720. Whenever the Administrator agrees to reimburse resource sponsors
for preconstruction expenses, such agreements "shall provide the Administrator an
option to acquire any such resource." Id. § 6(f)(3), 94 Stat. 2720. It is puzzling that major
renewable resources do not qualify for reimbursement of investigation and initial devel-
opment expenses while major nonrenewable resources do qualify for reimbursement for
investigation and preconstruction expenses.
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resource should reduce the utilities' financial risk 47 because all
the region's ratepayers will share the risk and lower interest
rates on construction bonds should result. In short, utilities
should have greater financial protection for their investment and
lower rates for their customers.
These four provisions should provide strong financial incen-
tives for utilities to cooperate with the Administrator. It is
unlikely that Pacific Northwest utilities will pass up the fiscal
advantages of cooperation. Thus, under PNEPPCA, the Admin-
istrator may become the focal point for most, if not all, future
Pacific Northwest electric power resource development.
C. The Cost-Effectiveness Test
The cost-effectiveness test is the polestar of resource acqui-
sition under PNEPPCA. Unless a resource is cost-effective, the
Administrator cannot acquire it without congressional
approval.48 A resource is cost-effective if it is forecast: (a) "to be
reliable and available within the time it is needed,"'49 and (b) "to
meet or reduce the electric power demand . . . at an estimated
incremental system cost no greater than that of the least-cost
similarly reliable and available alternative measure or resource
50. Id. § 3(4)(A)(ii), 94 Stat. 2698. Thus, PNEPPCA bases the
cost-effectiveness of resources on estimates and applies the test
when the Administrator decides to acquire the resource.
The fact that the cost estimate may later prove to be inac-
curate is immaterial to the legality of a cost-effectiveness deter-
mination. If events were to delay a resource's construction
beyond the time it is needed or if the estimated incremental sys-
tem cost were to turn out to be greater than for that of a simi-
larly available alternative, the resource acquisition decision can-
not be challenged on the grounds that the resource is not cost
effective because the resource was determined to be cost-effec-
tive when the resource was acquired. Assuming a limited need
for electric power, this result places a premium on the accuracy
of cost estimates and seems likely to result in sponsors of com-
peting resources vigorously attempting to convince the Adminis-
47. By shifting funding responsibility to the Administrator, the Act will spread the
risk among all the region's ratepayers rather than among a single utility's ratepayers. A
regional sharing of electric power costs is one of Congress' paramount interests. See id.
§ 2(4), 94 Stat. 2698.
48. Id. § 4(e)(1), 94 Stat. 2705; § 6(c)(3), 94 Stat. 2719-2720.
49. Id. § 3(4)(A)(i), 94 Stat. 2698.
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trator that their cost estimates are more accurate than those of
their competitors and that their resources cost less than their
competitors'. Under PNEPPCA, the Administrator's acquiring a
resource constitutes final agency action subject to judicial
review.51 Thus, the accuracy of cost estimates upon which such
acquisitions are based may be litigated. PNEPPCA, however,
bars actions not commenced within 90 days of the Administra-
tor's decision.52
The basis of cost-effectiveness under the Act is the esti-
mated incremental system costs including "estimate[s] of all
direct costs of a measure or resource over its effective life."5 3
Because estimates suffice, the Act does not require direct system
costs to be known exactly prior to the cost-effectiveness determi-
nation. The Act may therefore produce fact battles between pro-
ponents of competing resources over the accuracy of their
respective direct-system cost estimates. Although the Act
requires the Administrator to base resource acquisition decisions
on the evidence and to develop a record," the Administrator
need only produce reasonable estimates of direct-system costs to
justify his decision.55
As defined in the Act, direct system costs include: (a) "the
cost of distribution and transmission to the consumer," (b)"waste disposal costs,"5 7 (c) "end-of-cycle costs,"5 (d) "fuel
costs (including projected increases),"5 (e) "such quantifiable
51. Id. § 9(e)(1)(C), 94 Stat. 2731.
52. "[Sjuits shall be filed within ninety days of the time such action or decision is
deemed final, or, if notice of the action is required by this Act to be published in the
Federal Register, within ninety days from such notice, or be barred." Id. § 9(e)(5), 94
Stat. 2731-2732.
53. Id. § 3(4)(B), 94 Stat. 2698.
54. See id. § 6(c)(1), 94 Stat. 2718.
55. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). The Administrator may not act arbitrarily or
capriciously, and he may not abuse his discretion or act other than in accordance with
law.
56. PNEPPCA, supra note 16, § 3(4)(B), 94 Stat. 2698. This provision may influ-
ence the location of resources. If two resources have equal direct system costs, the
resource located closer to consumers will probably be less costly.
57. Id. Waste disposal costs presumably will include the cost of storing or processing
spent nuclear fuel. The waste disposal costs for renewable resources such as wind and
solar are certainly far lower than for nuclear resources, all other factors being equal. If
waste disposal costs are discounted to present value, however, they may be negligible for
long-term resources.
58. Id. This provision probably will adversely affect nuclear power development
because the cost of decommissioning a nuclear power plant is substantial, perhaps equal-
ing approximately 20 to 25% of the construction cost.
59. Id. The inclusion of fuel costs should promote conservation and renewable
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environmental costs and benefits as the Administrator deter-
mines, on the basis of a methodology developed by the Council
as part of the plan, or in the absence of the plan by the Admin-
istrator, are directly attributable to such [conservation] measure
or resource," 60 and (f) "other factors." 6' The first four elements
are relatively straightforward and, although it may defy modern
economics to produce meaningful cost estimates for these fac-
tors, any reasonable life-cycle cost estimate will probably be suf-
ficient. The sixth factor is a catchall granting the Administrator
discretion to add other considerations which either the Adminis-
trator or the Council 2 deem appropriate. The fifth element,
environmental costs, however, requires a closer examination.
The fifth element of direct system costs forces consideration
of external costs into the decision-making process. It plugs
direct environmental costs into the analysis, to the extent such
costs are quantifiable." Deciding which environmental costs are
quantifiable may be difficult, but distinguishing between direct
and indirect environmental costs may be virtually impossible.
Yet these distinctions may be crucial to a resource sponsor
because a resource's cost-effectiveness may vary significantly
depending upon which environmental costs the Administrator
deems quantifiable and directly attributable to that resource
resources. Therefore, this provision should prejudice the Administrator against resources
utilizing fossil fuels, particularly oil and gas.
60. Id. This provision should benefit conservation and renewable resources such as
solar at the expense of resources utilizing air and water polluting fuels such as coal and
oil.
61. Id. This provision provides flexibility for the Administrator to include other
direct system costs as he identifies them.
62. Id. The Administrator will determine those costs directly attributable to partic-
ular resources, on the basis of a methodology the council develops as part of the regional
plan.
63. The term "quantifiable" may mean "convertible into dollar equivalents," thus, if
the Administrator cannot assign a dollar value to an environmental or social cost or ben-
efit, it is not quantifiable. This result differs from the National Environmental Policy
Act which does not require conversion of environmental costs and benefits into dollars
and cents. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, § 102(B), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(B)
(1976). As long as the quantification is comparable to economic and engineering consid-
erations, NEPA views such comparisons as satisfactory even though the comparisons
involve different categories. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.23 (1980).
On the other hand, "quantifiable" may mean "convertible into concrete figures"
such as acres of land or tons of pollutants. The problem is that no one knows how to
convert acres of land into dollars. Thus, the Administrator may have to decide such
questions as whether a higher cancer incidence rate of two deaths per 100,000 people-
years is worth one mill per kilowatt hour. Conversations with Robert C. Lewis, BPA
economist, in Portland, Or. (1980).
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and to the resources of that sponsor's competitors. Thus,
although the fifth element is based on high ideals, it may prove
to be a source of consternation to the Administrator.
It is significant, however, that PNEPPCA includes direct
and quantifiable environmental benefits as well as costs in the
cost-effectiveness test. As a result, the balancing may include
such factors as air and water quality, and the potential for creat-
ing new jobs if the term "environmental" is interpreted to mean
that which "human environment" means under the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)." NEPAe5 requires federal
agencies to consider environmental factors including social
impacts in their decision-making process." As long as an agency
includes such environmental factors in its decision-making pro-
cess, NEPA is satisfied even though the agency fails to choose
the best environmental alternative. Unlike NEPA, PNEPPCA
mandates that the Administrator include direct and quantifiable
environmental costs in estimating cost-effectiveness. To this
extent, the Act cures one of NEPA's alleged defects"7 and fore-
closes the acquisition of environmentally costly resources. From
an economic view, the cost-effectiveness test represents Con-
gress' attempt to force the Administrator to estimate the true
social costs of resources under consideration for acquisition."
Thus, in this regard PNEPPCA represents a significant addition
to the body of environmental law.
III. THE PRIORITY SCHEME
A. First Priority to Conservation
Nationally syndicated columnist James J. (Jack) Kilpatrick
once referred to the idea of acquiring electric power through
conservation as "one of those dizzy theories from the Blue Eagle
School of Screwball Economics .... " Kilpatrick's remarks
64. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.8, .14 (1980).
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976).
66. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (1980).
67. Section 102(C) of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. 4332(C) (1976) is a procedural law. It there-
fore, does not require the decision-maker to make the best environmental decision.
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980).
68. For a fascinating analysis of the impact of social costs in the resource allocation
analysis, see Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960).
69. PACIFIC PowER & LIGHT Co., ANNUAL REPORT TO EMPLOYEES 1979, at 5 (1980)
(on file with the author). Kilpatrick was referring to Pacific Power & Light's weatheriza-
tion program which provides no-interest loans to consumers for cost-effective weatheriza-
tion measures.
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represent the prejudices against conservation that have plagued
some energy planners in the past. Those prejudices help explain
why some utilities have resisted conservation and alternative
energy technologies.70 The experts have had difficulty under-
standing that the energy problem is as much a social and cul-
tural problem as a technological one. " Seven years after the
1973 oil embargo, the Administrator still did not have express
authority to conserve electric power.s PNEPPCA, however,
remedies that deficiency.
1. Conservation Measured by Efficiency
The Act broadly defines conservation as any reduction in
electric power consumption resulting from increases in the effi-
ciency of energy use, production, or distribution.7 3 A wide vari-
ety of efficiency-improving actions qualify as conservation mea-
sures. For example, redesigning a coal boiler may qualify as a
conservation measure if the conversion increases energy produc-
tion efficiency. Similarly, converting two small capacity trans-
mission lines into a single, larger capacity line may be a conser-
70. Report by anthropologist Dr. Laura Nader, described in Salisbury, Energy Plan-
ners Resist Change, Social Scientist Finds, Christian Sci. Monitor, Jan. 22, 1980, at 10,
col. 1. Under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences, Dr. Nader studied the
attitudes of energy experts towards lifestyle changes which could result in two future
societies:
One [society] was essentially today's society projected into the future without
major changes in attitudes but with improvements in amenities and energy
efficiencies. In the second society, attitudes toward resources were significantly
different. The values of thrift and self-reliance were increased, resulting in high
technology but extremely low energy consumption.
Solar energy, advanced automobiles, magnetically levitated trains, com-
puter control of buildings and industrial applications, more efficient onsite
generation of electricity, major occupational shifts from large corporate to indi-
vidual jobs, and increased leisure and recreation time were assumed in the
alternative society.
Id. The experts accused proponents of the second society of "describing impossible
futures and planning futures that 'go against the grain of human nature'." Id. Nader
replied to criticism: "For me, denial [of the second society] translated into 'we don't like
it'." Id.
71. Id.
72. Op. U.S. Controller Gen. No. B-114858 (July 10, 1979) (opinion to Representa-
tive James Weaver regarding BPA authority to engage in energy conservation measures).
See also Letter from Assistant Attorney General Larry Sims to the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget. (Oct. 12, 1979) (unpublished opinion letter stating Need for Express
Congressional Approval Authorizing BPA to Implement Long-Range Conservation
Programs).
73. PNEPPCA, supra note 16, § 3(3), 94 Stat. 2698.
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vation measure if a net increase in energy distribution efficiency
results. Other measures electric energy consumers implement
may be conservation measures if they result in increased
efficiency.
Two significant results flow from using a conservation defi-
nition based on efficiency. First, electric power is not conserved
by merely displacing electric power with another energy source,
even a renewable resource. Thus, solar space heating will not
qualify as a conservation resource because a solar collector does
not improve a building's energy efficiency. The building will still
require the same amount of energy, although the energy to heat
the building comes partly from a source other than electric
power. Second, foregoing consumption is not a conservation
measure, because, paradoxically, energy must be consumed to be
conserved. Thus, turning down the thermostat is not PNEPPCA
conservation because, although it reduces resource use, it does
not increase efficiency. Congress failed to encourage residents of
the Northwest to reduce electric demand by the cheapest tech-
nique-foregoing consumption.
The Act's definition of conservation contains a contradic-
tion, however. Read literally, the definition requires that a gen-
erating resource reduce electric power consumption as a result of
increased electric power production efficiency to qualify as a
conservation resource. How can electric power consumption be
reduced as a result of a production efficiency increase? The
reduction in consumption criteria limits the scope of conserva-
tion resources to those which either (1) reduce electric energy
consumption as a result of increasing the efficiency of electric
energy use or distribution as opposed to reducing other forms of
energy consumption, or (2) increase the efficiency of electric
power production as opposed to increasing the efficiency of pro-
ducing energy other than electric power. Thus, the key to con-
servation is efficiency.7 4
Although the term "efficiency" is not defined in PNEPPCA
or its legislative history, increased efficiency probably results in
two instances. First, an increase in efficiency occurs when a
resource improves the net conversion of useful energy from one
form such as coal to another such as electric power. This defini-
74. Energy efficiency is a stated purpose of PNEPPCA. Id. § 2(1)(a)(2), 94 Stat.
2697.
[Vol. 4:299
Impact of Northwest Power Act
tion is derived from the First Law of Thermodynamics.7" Stated
more precisely, this First Law Efficiency 76 is "[t]he useful energy
transfer achieved by a device divided by the energy input
required to achieve the effect."' 77 The First Law Efficiency of a
resource may not be an adequate measure of a resource's merit
because this efficiency relies on energy as its basic unit of mea-
sure.78 Such a measure is inadequate because it ignores the qual-
ity of energy use. 9
For example, claiming that an oil furnace heats a building with
75% efficiency implies that 100% efficient furnace is the best
possible use of the available energy. This is an incorrect con-
clusion, because if the oil for the furnace had been used instead
as fuel for a turbine powering a heat pump, which can provide
more heat to the building than the total heating value of the
raw fuel, the energy of the oil would have been used more
effectively than in the furnace.so
Measurement based on First Law Efficiency disregards the
importance of energy use quality.
Second, an increase in efficiency also results when a
resource decreases the amount of available energy consumed in
doing a task compared to the theoretical amount of available
energy needed to accomplish that task. This definition is derived
from the Second Law of Thermodynamics." Stated more pre-
cisely, this Second Law Efficiency is "the ratio of the minimum
amount of available energy required to perform A task, to the
available energy task Amin actually consumed by use of a given
system. ' 82 The Second Law Efficiency "affords a method of
ranking energy uses by quality-of-energy use and the approach
to the thermodynamic limit of a given process." 83 Maximizing
the Second Law Efficiency minimizes consumption of energy in
75. F. KREITH & J. KREIDER, PRINCIPLES OF SOLAR ENGINEERING 27 (1978) (emphasis
omitted).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 28.
80. Id. at 27.
81. 11 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 238, 240 W. BENTON ED. 1973. "Efficiency is fixed
solely by the temperatures of the bodies between which, in the last resort, the transfer of
heat is effected." Id.
82. F. KREIrH, supra note 75, at 28 (emphasis omitted).
83. Id.
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accomplishing a given task.8' Therefore, that resource with the
highest Second Law Efficiency will always be the best resource
to acquire from a thermodynamic point of view.
The Act's broad conservation definition should ultimately
have a technology-forcing effect for two reasons. First, because
PNEPPCA affords top priority to conservation measures, the
Administrator will acquire all cost-effective technological
improvements that qualify as conservation measures. Second,
PNEPPCA gives a ten percent edge to conservation."8 Thus, the
Administrator is able to acquire innovative conservation tech-
niques which otherwise might not be cost-effective. PNEPPCA
should therefore encourage technological improvements in using
electric power efficiently.
2. Conservation Resources Installed by Residential and Small
Commercial Consumers
PNEPPCA further requires the Administrator to acquire
conservation resources installed by residential and small com-
mercial consumers to reduce load.8e Before the Administrator is
able to acquire any other resource to meet his contractual obli-
gations, he must determine that a need for power exists, after
taking into account the planned savings from conservation and
renewable resources acquired from residential and small com-
mercial consumers.8 7 These requirements should spur wide-
spread development of conservation and renewable resources
among residential and small commercial consumers.
3. Model Conservation Standards
In addition to encouraging conservation through resource
acquisition, PNEPPCA requires the Council to incorporate
model conservation standards 8 in the regional plan. These
84. Id.
85. PNEPPCA, supra note 16, § 3(4)(D), 94 Stat. 2699. The Administration may
phase out the 10% advantage to conservation after five years, or if on the basis of a
council study the Administration determiipes that the advantage is unnecessarily costly,
inequitable to consumers, or likely to impair the Administrator's ability to carry out his
obligation consistent with sound business principles. Id. § 4(k), 94 Stat. 2711-2712.
86. "The Administrator shall acquire such resources through conservation, imple-
ment all such conservation measures, and acquire such renewable resources which are
installed by a residential or small commercial consumer to reduce load, as the Adminis-
trator determines are consistent with the plan .... " Id. § 6(a)(1), 94 Stat. 2717.
87. Id. § 6(a)(2)(A), 94 Stat. 2717.
88. Model conservation standards to be included in the plan shall include, but
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model standards are, in effect, efficiency standards. PNEPPCA
gives force to the model standards because the Administrator
may, on the Council's recommendation, impose a surcharge
against any customer who fails to implement conservation mea-
sures comparable to the model standards89 If implemented, the
surcharge may be from ten to fifty percent of the rate charged
such customers. The surcharge enables the Administrator to
recover at least part of the additional costs incurred due to the
customer's failure to meet the model standards." An old chess
strategy maxim describes this penalty provision's probable
effect: the threat of a move is often more effective than the move
itself. Thus, the mere existence of the Administrator's authority
to impose a surcharge should encourage compliance with the
plan's model conservation standards.
PNEPPCA directs the Administrator to implement all con-
servation measures the Administrator determines are consistent
with the plan.'1 Such measures may include loans or grants to
consumers for insulation or weatherization, increased system
not be limited to, standards applicable to (A) new and existing structures, (B)
utility, customer, and governmental conservation programs, and (C) other con-
sumer actions for achieving conservation. Model conservation standards shall
reflect geographic and climatic differences within the region and other appro-
priate considerations, and shall be designed to produce all power savings that
are cost-effective for the region and economically feasible for consumers, tak-
ing into account financial assistance made available to consumers under section
6(a) of this Act. These model conservation standards shall be adopted by the
Council and included in the plan after consultation, in such manner as the
Council deems appropriate, with the Administrator, States, and political subdi-
visions, customers of the Administrator, and the public.
Id. § 4(f)(1), 94 Stat. 2706-2707.
89. The Council by a majority vote of the members of the Council is authorized
to recommend to the Administrator a surcharge and the Administrator may
thereafter impose such a surcharge in accordance with the methodology pro-
vided in the plan, on customers for those portions of their loads within the
region that are within States or political subdivisions which have not, or on the
Administrator's customers which have not, implemented conservation mea-
sures that achieve energy savings which the Administrator determines are com-
parable to those which would be obtained under such standards. Such
surcharges shall be established to recover such additional costs as the Adminis-
trator determines will be incurred because such projected energy savings
attributable to such conservation measures have not been achieved, but in no
case may such surcharges be less than 10 per centum or more than 50 per
centum of the Administrator's applicable rates for such loan or portion thereof.
Id. § 4(f)(2), 94 Stat. 2707.
90. Id.
91. Id. § 6(a)(1), 94 Stat. 2717.
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efficiency, and waste energy recovery.2 The Administrator may
assist the Administrator's customers and governmental authori-
ties' implementation of conservation measures by (1) providing
financial and technical assistance to encourage maximum cost-
effective voluntary conservation, (2) "aiding customers and gov-
ernmental authorities in implementing conservation standards,"
and (3) "conducting demonstration projects to determine the
cost-effectiveness of conservation measures and direct applica-
tion of renewable energy resources."'
4. Billing Credits
As a further incentive to conservation, the Administration
must grant billing credits to customers for independently imple-
mented conservation activities or for independently imple-
mented resources other than conservation which reduce the
Administration's obligation." Voluntarily implemented retail
rate structures which induce conservation or installation of con-
sumer-owned renewable resources may qualify for billing cred-
its.'5 The amount of the credit for conservation activities is
92. Id. § 6(a)(1)(A), 94 Stat. 2717.
Waste energy recovery by direct application includes measures such as the
recovery of heat produced in lighting or industrial processes and use of the
recovered heat to reduce space heating requirements; waste energy recovery
does not include measures such as solar water heating systems which by direct
application convert energy for use by consumers, however, such systems could
be acquired as a renewable resource under subsection 6(b).
S. REP. No. 272, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1979).
93. PNEPPCA, supra note 16, § 6(a)(1)(B)-(D), 94 Stat. 2717. These important pro-
visions are likely to be of technical assistance. The Administrator has the resources to
develop a highly trained professional staff to produce needed information. There are still
very few experts in the fields of solar and wind energy, thus, information costs are high.
Competent furnace salesmen know the BTU requirements of an average home and can
accurately advise potential consumers as to which systems are cheapest and most feasi-
ble. In contrast, virtually no one knows whom to call to obtain information about solar
installation. Even if solar power information is available, the average consumer unfamil-
iar with solar jargon may have difficulty understanding the information.
94. Id. § 6(h)(1), 94 Stat. 2720-2721. Billing credits for energy conservation activities
are not subject to the requirements of sections 4(e)(1) or 4(e)(2) of the Act. Billing
credits for other resources are subject to sections 4(e)(1) and 4(e)(2) of the Act. Id.
§ 6(h)(1)(B), 94 Stat. 2720-2721.
95. Retail rate structures which are voluntarily implemented by the Adminis-
trator's customers and which induce conservation or installation of consumer-
owned renewable resources shall be considered, for purposes of this subsection,
to be (A) conservation activities independently undertaken or carried on by
such customers, or (B) customer-owned renewable resources, and shall qualify
for billing credits upon the same showing as that required for other conserva-
tion or renewable resource activities.
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equal to the price the Administration would have had to pay to
acquire resources equal in amount to the energy saved by the
conservation activity for which the credit is granted."' In the
case of resources other than conservation, the credit is limited to
"Net cash actually incurred . . . in acquiring, constructing, or
operating the resource for which the credit is granted. 97
The purpose of the Act's billing credit provision is to over-
come the adverse effects of the Administrator's selling electric
power at a melded rate. Representative Weaver described the
adverse effects of the melding rate when he defended his unsuc-
cessful attempt to impose a two-tiered pricing structure:
What it [Representative Weaver's proposed amendment] does
is this: It prices electricity at its cost. In other words, what we
have today is a distorted price of electricity, of energy, so that
the price signals sent to people are distorted. They do not get
the message [that energy is expensive]; and, therefore, they do
not use electricity wisely.
In the Northwest we have millions o[f] tons of wood waste
that we burn in our forests. There are millions of tons of that
waste in Oregon forests, enough to heat three-quarters of all
the homes in Oregon. Yet we are not using that energy for the
simple reason that the way the utilities in Bonneville operate
with electricity, they take the cheap hydro power and the
expensive thermal power and average them, meld them
together. So we go on letting them build these enormously
expensive thermal plants, and we are wasting energy sources
that are much cheaper. It is crazy.9
Id. § 6(h)(5), 94 Stat. 2721.
96. The amount of credits for conservation under this subsection shall be set to
credit the customer implementing or continuing the conservation activity for
which the credit is granted for the savings resulting from such activity. The
rate impact on the Administrator's other customers of granting the credit shall
be equal to the rate impact such customers would have experienced had the
Administrator been obligated to acquire resources in an amount equal to that
actually saved by the activity for which the credit is granted.
Id. § 6(h)(3), 94 Stat. 2721.
97. For resources other than conservation, the customer shall be credited for
net costs actually incurred by such customer, an entity acting on behalf of such
customer, or political subdivision served by such customer, in acquiring, con-
structing, or operating the resource for which the credit is granted. The rate
impact to the Administrator's other customers of granting the credit shall be
no greater than the rate impact such customers would have experienced had
the Administrator been obligated to acquire resources in an amount equal to
that actually produced by the resource for which the credit is granted.
Id. § 6(h)(4), 94 Stat. 2721.
98. 126 CONG. Rac. H10,526 (daily ed. Nov. 12, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Weaver of
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Representative Swift countered Mr. Weaver's contentions by
noting that the General Accounting Office had indicated that the
billing credits would send an effective price signal encouraging
conservation. "
5. Acquiring Experimental Resources
The Administrator is authorized to acquire resources not
meeting the Act's requirements ordinarily applicable to resource
acquisitions if the resource is "an experimental, developmental,
demonstration, or pilot project of a type with a potential for
providing cost-effective service to the region."100 The Adminis-
trator is further ordered to make maximum use of the Adminis-
trator's authority "to acquire conservation measures and renew-
able resources, to implement conservation measures, and to
provide credits and technical and financial assistance for the
development and implementation of such resources and mea-
sures ... ."101 These directives should produce significant elec-
tric power conservation and spur the development of new and
innovative solutions to electric power shortages. PNEPPCA will
almost certainly result in a high degree of conservation and is
likely to lead to the development of new technologies designed
to maximize the efficiency of electric power production, distri-
bution, and use.
To summarize, PNEPPCA should strongly promote conser-
vation resources because they are top priority resources and they
additionally receive a ten percent edge under the Act over non-
Oregon).
99. Id. at H10,527 (remarks of Rep. Swift of Washington). The report from the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources states:
[T]hese credits are to provide an economic incentive for the development of
such resources taking into account the risks and benefits accruing to the entity
to be credited . . . . The Committee is concerned that such resources would
not otherwise be developed at an early date because it might be economically
disadvantageous for a customer or political subdivision to undertake such mea-
sures or resources if the alternative is to rely on the Administrator to serve
such loads at a melded rate.
S. REP. No. 272, supra note 99, at 30. The Senate registered its intent that such credits
be "available only to the extent that power is actually available from the resource for
which credits are granted." Id.
This contrasts with resource acquisitions where forecasts are sufficient. For this rea-
son, utilities may be reluctant to implement independent conservation measures or to
develop renewable resources unless they feel certain the resource will be cautious about
investing in untested technologies with the goal of seeking billing credits.
100. PNEPPCA, supra note 16, § 6(d), 94 Stat. 2719.
101. Id. § 6(e), 94 Stat. 2719.
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conservation resources. Furthermore, residential and small com-
mercial consumers should strive to install cost-effective conser-
vation measures the Administrator is then authorized to acquire.
The Model Conservation standards enable the Administrator to
impose a surcharge on customers who fail to comply with these
efficiency standards, and the Administrator may grant billing
credits to customers who independently institute conservation
activities in addition to those implemented by the Administrator
or required by the plan. The Act's system of incentives should
achieve conservation.
B. Second Priority to Renewable Resources
The bill defines "renewable resource" as a resource "which
utilizes solar, wind, hydro, geothermal, biomass, or similar
sources of energy and'. . . which is used for electric power gen-
eration or will reduce the electric power requirements of a con-
sumer, including by direct application. 102 The term "renewa-
ble" means that the energy source is "regenerative or essentially
inexhaustive." Any planned generation of electric power from a
renewable energy source is a renewable resource. The Adminis-
trator ordinarily is unable to acquire a renewable resource unless
it is cost-effective.103 Thus, as a prerequisite to acquisition, the
estimated incremental system cost of a renewable resource must
be less than ninety percent of the estimated incremental system
cost of any similarly available conservation measure and less
than the estimated incremental system cost of any similarly reli-
able and available renewable resource.
The Administration may be able to construct and own con-
servation and renewable resources which are not generating
facilities. Congress defined the term "acquire" to mean that the
Administrator is not authorized "to construct, or have ownership
of . . any electric generating facility."10 ' By negative implica-
tion, however, the Administrator may be authorized to own non-
electric-generating resources. PNEPPCA directs the Administra-
102. Id. § 3(16), 94 Stat. 2700.
103. See id. § 4(e)(1), 94 Stat. 2705; § 6(c)(3), 94 Stat. 2718-2719. The priorities in
the cost-effective resource determination are conservation, renewable resources, generat-
ing resources using waste heat or otherwise highly efficient resources, and, finally, all
other resources. Id. § 4(e)(1), 94 Stat. 2705. The Administrator may acquire resources
which are inconsistent with these and the considerations of section 4(e)(2) by securing
Congressional approval. Id. § 6(c)(3)(B), 94 Stat. 2719.
104. Id. § 3(1), 94 Stat. 2698.
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tor to look beyond the region for opportunities to add renewable
resources 05 to the region's power supply. The Administrator
may cooperate with the sponsor of such resources to accelerate
their development106 and he is authorized to acquire such
resources. 10 7
In addition, PNEPPCA authorizes the Administrator to
enter into an agreement with the sponsor of a renewable
resource which may be eligible for acquisition "to fund or secure
debt incurred in the investigation and initial development of
such resource."108 To enter into such agreements the Adminis-
trator must determine that an inequitable hardship to the con-
sumers of the resource's sponsor would exist if the Administra-
tor fails to enter into such an agreement. 109
One potential weakness of PNEPPCA arises when the BPA
Administrator attempts to compare the cost-effectiveness of a
first priority conservation measure with that of a second priority
renewable resource. The Act does not clarify whether the
Administrator should compute the resource promoter's tax con-
sequences, and other possible economic incentives, into the cost-
effectiveness test.110 If the tax consequences are included, the
cost-effectiveness will change as tax codes change. For example,
an individual may claim a federal tax credit equal to fifteen per-
cent of any energy conservation expenditure not to exceed
$2,000."' An individual, however, is entitled to a tax credit
105. PNEPPCA, supra note 16, § 6(1)(1), 94 Stat. 2722.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. § 6(f)(1)(A), 94 Stat. 2719. This provision does not apply to renewable
resources that are also major resources. Id.
109. Id. § 6(d), 94 Stat. 2719. This provision does not apply to major resources. Id.
The Administrator's authority is significant because of its technology-forcing effect. The
Administrator must only show a "potential" for providing cost-effective service to
acquire such experimental, developmental, demonstration, or pilot projects. It may be
extremely difficult to distinguish between an experimental and a commercial resource
because most experimentalism seems likely to lead to a showing of commercial feasibil-
ity. Perhaps a resource transforms itself from a research project into a commercial
resource when the most important product of the resource becomes energy rather than
data.
110. The Windfall Profit Tax Act prevents taxpayers from taking a tax credit and
receiving an additional federal benefit. I.R.C. § 6511(h).
111. "In the case of any dwelling unit, the qualified energy conservation expendi-
tures are 15 percent of so much of the energy conservation expenditures made by the
taxpayer during the taxable year with respect to such unit as does not exceed $2,000."
Id. § 44C(b)(1).
Additionally, a person may qualify for tax credits. "In the case of an individual,
there shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable
[Vol. 4:299
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equal to forty percent up to $10,000 expended for a renewable
energy source. 112 These differences could change cost-effective-
ness of some resources sufficiently to reverse the articulated
resource priority scheme.
Consider two resources that would deliver, or save, equal
amounts of power. Suppose the direct-system costs are $10,000
for each, one of which is a conservation resource and, the other
the least costly alternative renewable resource. Excluding tax
considerations, the Administrator would acquire the conserva-
tion measure because any conservation measure could cost up to
110 percent of the least costly alternative resource1 5 and, fur-
thermore, conservation is a first priority resource. Plugging the
year an amount equal to the sum of-(1) the qualified energy conservation expenditures,
plus (2) the qualified renewable energy source expenditures." Id. § 44C(a). However, only
insulation or any "other energy-conserving component" qualifies for the conservation tax
credit. Id. § 44C(c)(1). "The term 'other energy-conserving component' means ...an
item of the kind which the Secretary specifies by regulations as increasing the energy
efficiency of the dwelling . I... Id. § 44C(c)(4)(A)(viii). Thus, Congress has limited the
tax definition of conservation to specific measures that improve the efficiency of energy
use in dwellings.
112. "In the case of any dwelling unit, the qualified renewable energy source
expenditures are 40 percent of so much of the renewable energy source expenditures
made by the taxpayer during the taxable year with respect to such unit as does not
exceed $10,000." I.R.C. § 44C(b)(2). Only expenditures for "renewable energy source
property" qualify as renewable source expenditures.
The term 'renewable energy source property' means property-
(A) which, when installed in connection with a dwelling, transmits or uses-
(i) solar energy, energy derived from the geothermal deposits (as
defined in section 613(e)(3)), or any other form of renewable energy
which the Secretary specifies by regulations, for the purpose of heat-
ing or cooling such dwelling, . . . or
(ii) wind energy for nonbusiness residential purposes ....
Id. § 44C(c)(5). This definition is considerably narrower than the definition of renewable
resource contained in section 3(16) of PNEPPCA.
113. For purposes of this paragraph, the "estimated incremental system cost"
of any conservation measure or resource shall not be treated as greater than
that of any nonconservation measure or resource unless the incremental system
cost of such conservation measure or resource is in excess of 110 per centum of
the incremental system cost of the nonconservation measure or resource.
PNEPPCA, supra note 16, § 3(4)(D), 94 Stat. 2699.
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tax consequences into the equation, however, changes the result:
Conservation Renewable Resource
Direct System Costs: $10,000 $10,000
Tax Credits
15% of first $2,000: - 300 40% of first $10,000: - 4,000
Net Cost: $ 9,700 $ 6,000
10% Advantage: - 600
Comparison Cost: $ 9,100 $ 6,000
Thus, if the tax credits are included in the cost-effectiveness cal-
culation, the Administrator is required to acquire the renewable
resource rather than the conservation measure. In the hypotheti-
cal, the direct-system costs of the conservation measure would
have to be $3,100 less than the direct-system costs of the renew-
able resource for conservation to prevail, despite the ten percent
advantage of conservation. 14
Assuming the purpose of the cost-effectiveness test is to
determine which of two resources has the lower social cost, the
tax consequences should be omitted from the cost-effectiveness
test. This is true because taxpayers are subsidizing conservation
and renewable resources that qualify for tax benefits. The true
social cost of a resource includes those costs paid for by other
taxpayers.
In summary, the Administrator is likely to develop and
114. Thus, 3,100 dollars is 31% of $10,000. For resources costing $2,000, the advan-
tage to renewable resources is only 18% or $360.
Table IV
Conservation Renewable Resource
Direct System Costs: $2,000 $2,000
Tax Credit
15% of first $2,000: - 300 40% of first $2,000: - 800
New Cost: $1,700 $1,200
10% Advantage: - 120 - 0
Comparison Cost: $1,580 $1,200
The effect of state tax laws could further disrupt the priority scheme. For example, Ore-
gon provides a tax credit equal to 25% or $125 for a weatherization measure, whichever
is less. OR. REV. STAT. § 316.088 (1979). In comparison, Oregon provides a tax credit for
an alternative energy device equal to the lesser of either 25% of the actual cost or $1,000.
OR. REV. STAT. § 316.116 (1979). Inserting these figures into the cost-effectiveness test
results in the figures in Table V.
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acquire renewable resources for several reasons: first, they are
second priority resources; second, they are likely to be promoted
strongly by the Administrator; and third, billing credits and
other incentives such as the Administrator's financing investiga-
tion costs should favor the development of renewable resources
over other resources except conservation. The requirement that
the Administrator acquire renewable resources installed by resi-
dential and small commercial consumers to reduce load should
significantly promote renewable resource development among
these consumers. Finally, the Act should encourage the develop-
ment of new technology in the renewable resource field through
funding of experimental projects and through the economic ben-
efits that will accrue to successful resource promoters.
C. Third Priority to Waste Heat Utilization and High-Fuel
Conversion Efficiency
The Act assigns third priority to generating resources utiliz-
ing waste heat or generating resources of high-fuel conversion
efficiency.115 Presumably, generating resources are those which
generate electric power.116 This requirement precludes resources
Table V
Conservation Renewable Resource
Direct System Costs: $10,000 $10,000
Fed. Tax Credits
15% of first $2,000: - 300 40% of first $10,000: - 4,000
Oregon Tax Credits
25% or $125 - 125 25% or $1,000 - 1,000
Net Cost: $ 9,575 $ 5,000
10% Advantage: - 500 - 0
Comparison Cost: $ 9,075 $ 5,000
This is a difference of $4,075, which is an advantage to renewable resources.
Of particular interest to the proponents of geothermal resources is the geothermal
deposit depletion allowance which permits owners of geothermal deposits to deduct 15%
of the gross income from such deposits annually. I.R.C. § 613(a), 613(e). Geothermal
wells also qualify for special treatment of intangible drilling costs and for an energy
property investment credit. See id. § 263(c). Because geothermal resources are renewable
resources, the Administrator is more likely to acquire geothermal resources as a second
priority resource when the cost-effectiveness calculation includes tax consequences than
when it does not.
115. PNEPPCA, supra note 16, § 4(e)(1), 94 Stat. 2705.
116. Neither PNEPPCA nor its legislative history defines the term "generating
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utilizing waste heat for purposes other than for generating elec-
tric power.
Despite the requirement that third priority resources must
be generating resources, the Act's distinction between conserva-
tion measures and third priority resources is difficult to ascer-
tain. Consider the case of a cogeneration resource 117 using coal to
produce electric power and steam for manufacturing. Because
cogeneration reduces transmission losses and may increase the
efficiency of energy use by extracting more work from each calo-
rie of fuel consumed, some cogeneration resources may arguably
be conservation resources. PNEPPCA does not require that the
increased efficiency in energy use be an increase in the efficiency
of electric energy use to qualify as a conservation resource.
Thus, PNEPPCA should promote improved coal consumption
efficiency when coal is used to produce electric power in cogener-
ation resources.
Cogeneration resources using wood or municipal waste may
qualify as renewable resources because they utilize renewable
biomass to produce electricity. Interestingly, some cogeneration
resources may not qualify as generating resources utilizing waste
heat because not all cogeneration resources extract energy to
produce electricity from waste heat; often electric power is pro-
duced directly from energy produced specifically for that pur-
pose rather than from heat that would otherwise be wasted.118 In
short, the Administrator must determine the priority of cogener-
ation resources on a case-by-case basis.
PNEPPCA fails to define "high-fuel conversion efficiency,"
and reference to the Act's legislative history is unavailing. The
term implies that in comparing two resources, that resource
utilizing fuel more efficiently will be a third priority resource,
and the other resource will be a fourth priority resource.
Because cogeneration resources do not inherently possess high
fuel efficiency, cogeneration may not qualify as a third priority
resource at all. The high-fuel efficiency conversion test is a tech-
nology-forcing standard similar to the best available technology
resources."
117. See generally OREGON STATE BAR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION: INDUSTRIAL
PRODUCTION AND COGENERATION OF ELECTRICITY (1979).
118. Id. This analysis hinges on the meaning of the word "waste." If waste means
"unwanted, useless leftover," the heat produced by cogeneration is hardly waste heat
because the producer intends to use it. The heat loss during cogeneration would, of
course, qualify as a third priority resource were it recovered.
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and the best practicable technology standards of the Federal
Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 1 9
Numerous innovative technologies are likely to qualify as
third priority resources. For example, a fluidized bed boiler1 20
promises high fuel conversion efficiency and a low pollutant
level.121 Another example of a third priority resource utilizing
waste heat would be a resource extracting waste heat via the
method used in Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion.2 2 Waste
heat, extracted from the waste hot water of a nuclear power
plant, could be a first priority conservation resource because
such an extraction may increase the efficiency of nuclear fuel use
by producing more electric power per unit of fuel. Thus, the
third priority is also likely to promote innovative approaches to
energy use because of its emphasis on waste heat utilization and
efficiency.
D. Fourth Priority to All Other Resources
The term "fourth priority resource" seems a misnomer
because PNEPPCA does not describe a lower priority resource.
The Administrator, however, cannot indiscriminately acquire
any fourth priority resource. The Administrator must show that
the acquired resource is the least-costly similarly reliable and
available alternative.2 " This least-cost requirement is a priority
scheme based solely on cost without any legislative bias in favor
of a particular resource class. The Administrator can acquire
either of two fourth priority resources provided their estimated
incremental system costs are equal. Presumably, fourth priority
resources include conventional thermal resources such as
nuclear, coal, oil, gas, and any resources not qualifying for a
119. Air Pollution Control, ch. 85, 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642 (1977).
120. A fluidized bed boiler is a furnace that burns coal on a bed of fluidized sand
which is similar to quicksand. The bed boiler is very similar in principle to a black-
smith's forge. The advantage of fluidized bed boilers is that the fire tends to burn at high
temperatures which yields a very efficient conversion ratio and a much lower pollutant
level.
121. The amount of polluting byproducts is less because more complete combustion
occurs at elevated temperatures.
122. Basically, thermal energy conversion systems extract heat by immersing a
working fluid such as freon into a source of heat, an example of which is waste hot water
from a nuclear plant. The hot water vaporizes the fluid which then passes through a
turbine, cools, and recycles.
123. See PNEPPCA, supra note 16, § 3(4)(A)(1), 94 Stat. 2698; § 4(e)(1), 94 Stat.
2705.
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higher priority.
The fact that a resource is a fourth priority resource does
not mean that it cannot compete effectively against higher prior-
ity resources. These conventional resources have the distinct
advantage of known characteristics in determining the amount
and quality of electric power that a resource will be expected to
save or produce. In comparing resources, the Administrator
must take into account "appropriate historical experience with
similar measures or resources."'1 2' Conventional resources'
direct-system costs may be easier to estimate, and the ability to
calculate the direct-system costs of a resource accurately favors
the resource because the logic of Pascal's Wager causes the
Administrator to estimate direct-system costs conservatively to
reduce the consequences of an incorrect guess. Thus, the Admin-
istrator may conclude, for example, that proceeding on the basis
of known direct-system costs may be a better choice than pro-
ceeding on the basis of estimated but unknown direct-system
costs.
The cost-effectiveness test also requires that a resource be
available within the time it is needed.12 5 This availability
requirement places a premium on accurate demand forecasting.
Planners know construction times for conventional resources
with reasonable certainty, whereas proponents of a new technol-
ogy may be unable to demonstrate that a new resource will be
available within the necessary time. At some future date a
fourth priority resource already constructed may be the only
resource the Administrator can acquire because it may be the
only one available at the time of an unanticipated shortage. Of
course some fourth priority resources are the least costly. In
short, acquisition of some fourth priority resources seems cer-
tain. Given the factors discussed above, fourth priority resources
may be capable of competing quite well within the priority
scheme, especially when competing with new, untested
technologies.
IV. CONCLUSION
The logic of Pascal's Wager leads to the conclusion that the
Administrator and other electric power suppliers will attempt to
acquire sufficient resources to meet the projected demand. The
124. Id. § 3(4)(c), 94 Stat. 2699.
125. Id. § 3(4)(A)(1), 94 Stat. 2698.
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Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation
Act will influence the type of resources the region will acquire to
meet future demand. PNEPPCA provides several incentives
designed to encourage the development of a wide variety of
resource technologies-especially renewable resources and con-
servation. At the core of the proposed allocation process is the
resource priority scheme which seems likely to promote resource
development in the order of its priorities. On the other hand, the
overriding consideration in resource acquisition is cost-effective-
ness. Perhaps most importantly, PNEPPCA assures proponents
of all resources the opportunity to demonstrate the advantages
of acquiring their respective resources.
The key to a successful acquisition under the Act rests on
proof that the proposed resource is cost-effective. At the same
time, PNEPPCA's melded rates may mask the true social cost of
electric power by sending inappropriate price signals to consum-
ers. Yet, to the degree that estimates of environmental costs
accurately reflect external costs, the acquisition of resources will
be economically sound"' decisions. The priority scheme influ-
ences acquisition decisions only where competing resources pos-
sess equal system costs. In this instance, the priority scheme
favors conservation thus promoting the efficiency of electric
power usage. Similarly, utilization of renewable resources should
also be promoted.
To summarize, PNEPPCA seems likely to produce at least
four significant impacts on the resource acquisition process.
First, the Act should stimulate technological improvements in
the efficiency of electric power generation, distribution, and con-
sumption. Second, PNEPPCA should spur development of new
resources to meet anticipated needs. Third, the burden of
finding electric power to satisfy the region's insatiable desire for
more energy will likely shift to the Administrator, although the
126. The most important factor in rational economic decision-making is accurate
information. See generally M. F=umm, supra note 9. Because the acquisition process
should develop a greater amount of more accurate information pertaining to the true
costs of energy resources, decision-making should improve. Contra, Boly, Energy Bill
Clears Path for Nukes, Willamette Week, April 7, 1980, at 1, col. 1. Boly suggests that
the bill would "lead to a nuclear-power-plant building boom." Id. Although some provi-
sions of the bill might favor nuclear power, the bill's thrust is to require that proponents
of a specific resource prove that their resource has the least social and environmental
cost. To the degree that the Administrator is biased in favor of a particular resource,
acquisition of that resource could have a slight advantage if other factors are equal. The
solution to any such bias is political--change the Administrator in power.
19811
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Pacific Northwest should see a high degree of cooperation
among all utilities. Finally, PNEPPCA should encourage devel-
opment of resources as though they were owned by a single
utility.
